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ABSTRACT 
Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessels have been in operation for four decades and there 
are now well over 250 vessels in existence, but their gas equivalent floating liquid natural gas plants 
kwon as FLNGs are still very new. Consequently designs and arrangement of top-side process units are 
still evolving and their safety has yet to be fully and objectively evaluated. This paper explores the 
probability of occurrence of accidents leading to vapour cloud explosion at one of the topside 
liquefaction modules of an FLNG. The worst possible scenario with the maximum tolerable probability 
is identified and the impact of the corresponding vapour cloud explosion is estimated. The strength of 
the structures supporting the neighbouring modules was examined using finite element analysis to 
determine if the accident has a potential of escalating to neighbouring modules. 
It is found that the current levels of safety gaps between the liquefaction modules may be insufficient 
for the structural arrangement in place. It is thought that a new structural design using circular pipes as 
the structural elements instead of the I-beams may enhance the integrity of the top-side supporting 
structures against the impact of potential vapour cloud explosion. The effectiveness of the new structure 
is demonstrated by comparing it to the conventional supporting structure using I-beam members. This 
also implies that, by using pipe elements, the safety gaps can be reduced, thus making it possible to 
optimise the topside arrangement more easily. 
 
Keywords: FLNG, risk assessment, safety, safety gap, structural strength, vapour cloud explosion, 
safety evaluation 
  
List of symbols 
 
Aleak            Cross-sectional area of leak (m2) 
CG              Discharge coefficient for gas (= 0.85) 
CL              Discharge coefficient used for liquid (= 0.61) 
E               Total available energy (= 3,100 kJ/m3) 
gc              Gas constant (1kg m/N· sec2) 
Hc_mixture         Heat of combustion for mixtures 
Hc(gas)           Lower heat of combustion of gas (J/g) 
Hc(TNT)                Heat of combustion of TNT (approx. 4,680 J/g) 
hi               Heat of combustion for a certain fluid j 
mTNT                  Equivalent mass of TNT (kg) 
mVCE            Mass contributing to vapour cloud explosion (kg) 
MolW            Molecular Weight (kg/kmol) 
MW             Mach number 
Pa              Atmosphere pressure (Pa)        
PI              Absolute pressure inside pipe (Pa) 
Ps               Peak overpressure (Pa) 
sP               Dimensionless peak overpressure 
QV_leak               Leak rate for vapour (kg/s) 
QL_leak               Leak rate for liquid (kg/s) 
Ts                Storage temperature (K) 
Rd              Distance from the ground zero point of VCE (m) 
RG             Gas constant ( = 8,314 J/Kmol K) 
R              Combustion energy scaled distance (m) for TNO and BST explosion models 
yi              Mass fraction for a certain fluid j 
Ze             Scaled distance (m/kg1/3) 
Ș              Empirical explosion efficient (generally 1% ~ 10%) 
ȡL                     Density of liquid (kg/m3) 
 
 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
Offshore gas production and processing has mostly relied on permanent or semi-permanent bottom-
supported structures. The initial investment required for such facilities is very high, and most of these 
structures cannot be reused when the gas field they serve is exhausted. In the current climate of low 
energy price developing offshore gas fields which are getting smaller using the bottom-supported 
structure is becoming highly uneconomical. Furthermore, much of the processing of the produced 
natural gas is usually carried out on shore. However, this requires extensive facilities on shore areas and 
the process of obtaining permission to build such facilities is long and difficult.  
These problems can largely be overcome when floating production units, known as LNG-FPSO 
(liquefied natural gas floating production storage offloading unit) or FLNG (floating liquid natural gas 
unit), are used. Since their first appearance in 2011, the total annual production capacity of FLNGs 
across the world reached 168.3 million tonnes as of early 2015 (IGU, 2015). 
The topside of a typical FLNG consists of compact structures comprising several chemical processing 
units for separation of gas from oil, gas liquefaction, LNG storage, offloading and so forth. 
Consequently the probability of the occurrence of an unwanted release of LNG (or natural gas) can be 
relatively high. Since the released fluid is likely to be trapped within these compact structures, an 
accidental ignition will lead to critical consequences associated with vapour cloud explosion (VCE), 
possibly resulting in the accident escalating to neighbouring process systems. 
In an effort to prevent the impact of such incidents from spreading to neighbouring structures, the 
concept of safety gap between the topside LNG process modules has been introduced. For instance, the 
LNG liquefaction modules installed on the world's largest FLNG unit were arranged in such a way that 
they are separated from each other by a safety gap of 12.5m to 20m (Li J. et al, 2016). Despite such 
precautions, it appears that the supporting structures of the liquefaction units are not specially 
strengthened against potential VCE (personal interview with one of the designers of the vessel). 
Moreover, it can be argued that the extent of the safety gaps are determined somewhat arbitrarily. 
The concept of FLNG is still new and the safety of the top-side system has yet to be fully verified. As 
a result, the existing relevant standards, such as NORSOK and API, and classification rules are mostly 
limited to the provisions of general guidelines. No systematic investigation into the safety of FLNG has 
been undertaken to date, and the closest previous studies were on the risk of semi-submersible rigs and 
FPSOs (Jin, 2015; Bai, 2016; Sohn et al, 2013; Faber et al, 2012; Heredia-Zavoni et al, 2012). 
Dan (Dan et al, 2014) has investigated individual risk associated with fire and explosion caused by the 
top-side liquefaction process of FLNG. Chae (Chae, 2016) explored the changes in risk characteristics 
depending on different selection of liquefaction systems. Despite these studies, the safety of FLNG, 
especially structural design and arrangement of top-side units, has rarely been evaluated in a systematic 
way. Spouge (1999) and Vinnem (2007) provided general guidance for quantitative risk assessment of 
offshore oil and gas units. 
In terms of structural analysis associated with offshore fire/explosion, there have been extensive studies. 
Paik et al. (2014) has introduced a new procedure for the nonlinear structural response analysis of 
offshore installations in explosions. Paik et al. (2016) investigated hydrocarbon risks of hydrocarbon 
explosion and fire for offshore units. In addition, structural integrity against gas explosion have been 
investigated by Czujko and Paik (2015) and Sohn et al. (2016). Eslami-Majd and Rahbar-Ranji (2015) 
has investigated the effect of corrosion on the structures against explosion. 
 
The work presented in this paper attempted to compare the safety of supporting structures for 
liquefaction modules with a potential VCE at a neighbouring module, providing a generic understanding 
of adequacy or inadequacy of the current practices. In addition, it would suggest practicable 
recommendations for future designs/arrangements of FLNG top-side liquefaction modules. 
 
  
2. Approaches adopted 
The objective of this study is to investigate the structural safety of LNG liquefaction modules against 
potential VCE. This is achieved by identifying the most severe explosion scenario with the minimum 
tolerable probability of occurrence. Existing standards and guidelines give different tolerability criterion, 
but the present study adopted the level of 10-3 per year as guided by the UK Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) (Holden, 2014). 
The scenarios were converted to corresponding explosion overpressure values and this was then made 
into an exceedance diagram from which the overpressure corresponding to the tolerable frequency of 
occurrence was identified as shown in Fig. 5 in Section 3.3. 
Finite element analysis is carried out on the supporting structures of the liquefaction modules to 
determine if they have sufficient strength to withstand the overpressure due to the VCE. The approaches 
used in this study are summarized as below. 
 
2.1.   System grouping 
For a complex system the risk level depends on the location of the initial leak and different working 
conditions. In order to deal with such complexity effectively, the system can be split into several groups 
based on fluid phase, compositions, operating pressure and temperature (Jeong et al., 2016). The risk 
of each group can be assessed separately and then summed to produce the overall risk of the whole 
system. 
 
2.2. Frequency analysis 
In order to identify all possible routes leading to VCE and its frequency, event tree analysis (ETA) 
technique is used as shown in Fig. 1 (Dan et al, 2014). Following the scenarios in ETA, the VCE is 
assumed to occur when a leakage e is sufficiently developed and vaporized (Woodward and Pitbaldo, 
2010). Depending on the surrounding condition, if it is largely open or congested, explosion or flash 
fire can occur. Some use a congestion rate of 50 % which makes the probability of explosion and flash 
fire 50 % each once the ignition is delayed (Dan et al., 2014). On the other hand, an immediate ignition 
may lead to jet fire or pool fire, rather than explosion, depending on fuel phase (Woodward and Pitbaldo, 
2010). Despite this, the focus of this study is to investigate the design and arrangement of each 
supporting structures of LNG liquefaction module. 
In order to estimate the frequency of VCE, this paper is relied upon generic data widely used for 
investigating hydrocarbon release associated with LNG process equipment in offshore and chemical 
industries. According to the DNV Leak Frequency Datasheets (DNV, 2012) the frequency of an initial 
leak from the liquefaction units are analysed for different leak hole sizes: 3 mm, 10 mm, 50 mm and 
full (100 mm). The probability of immediate ignition is estimated according to DNV model (DNV, 
2012) as shown in Table 1 with which the probability of immediate ignition is estimated based on the 
fuel phase and release rate. On the other hand, the probability of delayed ignition for LNG leak and gas 
is estimated according to OGP model (OGP, 2010) as shown in Table 2 which uses two different models 
depending on whether the fuel is gas or liquid. Similar to DNV model, release rate is importantly used 
to estimate the probability of delayed ignition. 
 
2.3. Consequence analysis 
Consequence analysis is focused on the investigation of the magnitude of the overpressure caused by 
VCE imposing on which is exposed to the supporting structure of LNG liquefaction modules. In order 
to estimate the impact of VCE three different analytical models are used: TNT equivalent method, TNO 
multi-energy and the Baker-Strehlow-Tang model (BST) (Woodward and Pitbaldo, 2010). 
 
2.3.1. Calculation of leak rate 
The leak rate depends on leak hole size and working conditions. For liquid leak calculation, Eq. (1) can 
be applied (DNV, 2012). 
 
L_leak liquid leak L I aQ =C A 2ȡ 3 3               (1) 
 
The gas leak rate was estimated with respect to the two specific flow regimes: sonic flow for higher 
internal pressures and subsonic flow for lower pressures. Eq. (2) defines the pressure at which the flow 
regimes change from sonic to subsonic (Yoon et al., 2008). 
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For subsonic flow, leak rate can be calculated as: 
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The total leak amount is calculated by multiplying the leak rate by the leak duration. 
 
2.3.2. Calculation of VCE impact 
 
TNT equivalency model 
TNT equivalent explosion model can be used to calculate the overpressure developing at specified 
distances. Eqs (5-8) describes associated formulae (Baker, 1973; Crowl and Louvar, 1990). The total 
energy engaged in the VCE was initially converted into the equivalent mass of TNT by 
VEC c_mixture
TNT
c(TNT)
m Șǻ+
m = ǻ+           (5)  
The total combustion energy of mixtures was calculated with 
K
c_mixture j j
j=1
ǻ+  \ K¦     (6) 
Based on the experiments, empirical explosion efficiency is generally set between 1 %~10 %. In order 
to investigate the most stringent condition, the present study adopted 10 %. The scaling parameter, Ze, 
can be calculated as 
d
1
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m
          (7) 
This parameter was then used to estimate the overpressure, Ps  
-1.685
sP =573×Ze (in KPa)          (8) 
 
TNO multi-energy model 
This model is increasingly acknowledged as a more reasonable alternative to TNT (Woodward, 2010). 
The overpressure value can be calculated as (Alonso et al., 2006), 
s s 0P =P P           (9) 
Then, the dimensionless peak pressure can be calculated as 
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Here R is the combustion energy scale distance, which is merely a convention to be readily converted 
to other forms of normalization. 
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Baker-Strehlow-Tang (BST) model 
The BST model is similar to the TNO Multi-Energy Model. Eq. (11) is used to obtain the combustion 
energy scale distance (Melton and Marx, 2009; Woodward and Pitbaldo, 2010). The curves used in the 
BST model, shown in Fig. 2, are based on numerical modelling of constant velocity flames and 
accelerating flames spreading through spherical vapour clouds. 
Mw, referred to DVµmach number¶, is determined by a combination of flame expansion dimension, fuel 
reactivity and obstacle density as shown in Table 3. Baker (Baker et al, 1994) suggested the fuel 
reactivity for methane to be FDWHJRULVHGµORZ¶ Taking into account of the µhigh¶ obstacle density (denser 
than 5.7 % of total space volume) in the topside and 2.5-dimension flame expansion direction, the Mw 
suggested by the model for the case studied here is 0.5 (Melton and Marx, 2009; Woodward and 
Pitbaldo, 2010). 
For investigating worst-case scenarios, this study assumes the total amount of leaked fuel is involved 
in the VCE, and this amount, mVCE, is equal to the leakage rate calculated from Eqs (1-4) multiplied by 
the total leakage duration. The leakage duration may vary depending on safety systems on topside units. 
The duration will be discussed in Section 3.  
 
2.4.  Investigating structural safety 
This step is for investigating the adequacy of the structures based on present design practices using the 
estimated impact of VCE at the distance of the safety gaps. Reflecting the fact that different leak 
scenarios give rise to different impact of VCE, frequency analysis was carried out to derive an 
exceedance curve between frequency and overpressure on the neighbouring structures. It then 
determines the critical level of overpressure by applying tolerable frequency level of 1.0E-3 /year. Once 
the critical degree of overpressure is determined, finite element analysis (FEA) is used to investigate 
the effect of the critical overpressures on the structures. If the equivalent stress of the structure against 
the overpressure is found to be higher than that allowed by the classification rules for the material, 
additional safety measures need to be introduced. One such safety measure can involve a new structural 
design using pipe elements instead of I beams. The effectiveness of such a structural design is 
investigated, and the results are compared to the conventional I-beam structures. This will certainly 
highlight the adequacy or otherwise of the current practices for setting up safety gaps between LNG re-
liquefaction modules. In addition, it may also point to a possible simple improvement measure to 
enhance the safety of FLNGs. 
 
 
3. Case study 
3.1.  The case ship 
The study was carried out on the topside area of a developed concept FLNG design (Li et al, 2016). The 
vessel is 480 metres in length, 75 metres in breadth (Fig. 3) and the vessel can process up to 3.6 million 
tons of gas annually. 
 
3.2.  System description and grouping 
Fig. 4 shows the liquefaction process, known as DMR (dual mixed refrigerant) cycle, fitted to each 
liquefaction module of the vessel (Lee et al., 2012). The system mainly consists of two coolers using 
sea water, three compressors, four heat exchanger, five expansion valves and two phase separators. It 
has a two-stage liquefaction process utilizing mixed refrigerants (methane, ethane, propane, butane, 
nitrogen, etc.) for pre-cooling, and main refrigerants (natural gas) for liquefaction. 
According to the operational characteristics, the overall liquefaction system can be spilt into 31 groups 
in total and the details are listed in Table 4 (Lee et al., 2012). The numbers in circles in the figure denote 
the group numbers in Table 3. 
 
3.3.  Frequency of critical overpressure  
Four leak hole sizes were selected to represent the leak dimensions (3, 10, 50 and 100 mm diameter). 
Using DNV Database described in Section 2.1, the initial frequencies of fuel leak for the four 
representative leak hole sizes were calculated as shown in Table 5, resulting in 124 case VCE scenarios 
in total. Then, the estimated initial leak frequency for each scenario was input to ETA described with 
Fig. 2 to estimate the probability of VCE. 
The leakage rate for each hole size was then calculated by using Eqs (1-4) and the results are 
summarised in Table 6. It was assumed that the flammable mass, mVCE, involved in the VCE is 
equivalent to the total released amount from each leak scenario. 
To investigate the impact of VCE on the supporting structures for LNG liquefaction modules, VCE was 
assumed to be initiated in module 9. According to the original topside design of the vessel (Fig. 5), three 
different safety gaps were used: 20 m (Case 1) for Module 11, 15 m (Case 2) for Module 10 and 12.5 
m (Case 3) for Module 7.  
In accordance with the DNV guidelines (DNV, 2012), this study assumed the leak duration equivalent 
to the total ESD (Emergency Shut Down System) working time of 90 seconds (60 seconds for detection 
and initiation, 30 seconds for isolation). 
The ignition point was assumed to be at the nearest boundaries to the neighbouring modules (Modules 
7, 10 and 11) of the module 9 where the impact of VCE to the supporting structures is the most severe. 
Based on the safety gaps equivalent to the distance from VCE ignition point, Rd as used in Eqs (7) and 
(11), applied to the case vessel, the consequence was translated into the overpressure of explosion at 
the tolerable frequency (1.0E-3/year). The exceedance diagram of Fig. 6 presents the probability of 
overpressure generated due to VCE calculated by TNT method. For each case, critical overpressures 
are determined where tolerable frequency of 1.0E-3 / year is met. 
Table 7 presents the critical overpressures imposed on the supporting structures at the different safety 
gaps. It highlights the somewhat different results obtained from different empirical methods used for 
the estimation of overpressure. For Case 1 the overpressure calculated by means of TNO method is 
relatively higher than others. For Cases 2 and 3 the TNT method produces higher overpressure than 
others: TNT (0.77 bar), TNO (1.0 bar) and BST (0.7 bar) for Case 1, TNT (1.24 bar), TNO and BST 
(1.0 bar) for Case 2 while TNT (1.82 bar) and TNO and BST (1.0 bar) for Case 3. 
 
3.4.  Structural safety 
Having calculated the potential impact of VCE, the structural strength of the LNG liquifaciton modules 
were evaluated using FEA. The FEA model was based on the geometry and material properties 
determined from the current design practices. The material was mild steel having the allowable 
equivalent stress of 245 N/mm2 accoring to the rule of DNV Classification (DNV, 2015). The structural 
foundations consisted of four stools on the hull deck level. The location of the the stools were considered 
as fixed. In addition, I-beams for horizontal supporting members were used in the design. In FEA, beam 
HOHPHQWVµEHDP¶LQ$16<6were used to represent the supporting members. Mesh size was 200 
mm. I-beam dimensions used in the model is given in Table 8 (DSME, 2013b). Fig. 7 shows the 
structural model of the LNG liquefaction module. 
The thickness of the steel beams was deducted by 1 mm to account for corrosion based on the rule of 
DNV Classification (DNV, 2015). Equipment weight was applied to the model as a static load on the 
top and upper decks, assuming 0.5 tonnes/m2 as shown in Fig. 8. 
In order to investigate the impact of VCE transient (dynamic) analysis was carried out. Based on a 
previous research result (Aiwei, 2012), the blast velocity was assumed to be 50 m/sec and the triangular 
pressure load profile was applied as shown in Fig. 9. 
In this context, the pressure distributions for TNT model is shown as a function of time in Fig. 10 (a). 
Total duration was set to be 0.15 seconds (3 times of duration of th blast) and maximum pressure value 
equivelent to the peak overpressures, Ps, obtained from the empirical models. To the next, 10 % of the 
peak positive phase pressure was applied to the lowest negative phase pressure based on the industrial 
guidance (Fig. 9) (Aiwei, 2012). Same pressure distributions were applied for TNO and BST models as 
shown in Fig 10 (b) and (c). 6WLIIHQHVVSURSRUWLRQDOGDPSLQJFRHIILFLHQWVĮDQGȕZHUHDVVXPHGto be 
0.24572 and 0.000954 based on the actual value of the similar construction module (DSME, 2013a). 
Applying different overpressures estimated earlier, the structural strength for the three different cases 
was evaluated. The explosion pressures are applied to the forward section of the module 11, on the port 
side elevation of the module 10 and on the aft section of the module 7 and these are denoted as Cases 
1, 2 and 3, respectively (Fig. 11). For a worst-case scenario, the blast of VCE was assumed to be 
impacted in horizontal direction on the web section of the I-beam where the section properties are 
relatively weak. 
Fig. 12 shows the FEA results for the gredients of equivalent stresses imposed on the structures against 
overpressure estimated by the TNT model, revealing that the maximum equivalent stress imposed on 
the structure was 526.6 N/mm2 for Case 1, 873.9 N/mm2 for Case 2 and 1,480.5 N/mm2 for Case 3. In 
all cases the stress far exceeds the tolerable level (245.0 N/mm2 for mild steel).  
Different explosion models, TNO and BST, led to similar results as listed in Table 9. The I-beams are 
the weakest against the horizontal load. It can be concluded, therefore, that the current design using I-
beams only may not be strong enough.  
 
3.5.  Safety measures (structural modification) 
In order to improve the structural intergrity against the impact of explosion in horizontal direction, the 
I-beams were replaced with circular pipes. Table 10 shows the list of pipe dimensions equivelant to I-
beams listed in Table 7. The modified structure was reanalysed for the three cases and these cases were 
designated as E_Case 1, E_Case 2 and E_Case 3. 
 
The same boundary conditions were used, and the results are illustrated in the Fig. 13. The maximum 
equivalent stresses on the pipe structure were 219.3 N/mm2 for E_Case 1, 282.5 N/mm2 for E_Case 2, 
317.1 N/mm2 for E_Case 3. The same geometry was modelled using  using TNO and BST models for 
overpressure values and the results are summarised in Table 11. 
By replacing the I-beams with equivalent pipe elements, the equivalent stresses are seen to have been 
reduced by 54 ~ 78 %, even though the equivalent stresses are still higher than the allowable stress for 
safety gaps of 15 m and less. It can be concluded that pipes are superior to traditional I-beams in this 
case. 
It is worth noting that the area of the structure directly subjected to explosion pressure also determines 
how much total force is applied to the structure. Therefore, the arrangement of the top-side modules 
will also contribute to the mitigation of the explosion impact. 
 
Since I-beams are much weaker for the loads on the web than those applied on the flanges (Fig. 14(a)), 
the direction of the VCE impact is critical. On the other hand, the strength of pipe elements is equally 
strong for loads from all directions (Fig. 14(b)), and therefore the direction of VCE impact is much less 
important. 
 
 
4. Discussion  
This paper focused on revealing the shortcomings in the current regulatory provisions and practices 
with regard to the extent of safety gaps in LNG process system on topside of FLNG. In this context, 
this paper investigated the safety of the system according to rule-PDNHUV¶VWDQGDUGV)RUWKLVSXUSRVH
too case-VSHFLILFVWXGLHVXVLQJGHVLJQHUV¶DSSURDFKPD\IDLO WRprovide a useful insight of general 
safety. The resulting findings may be subject to questions of general applicability.  
7RSUHYHQWWKLVLVVXHµUXOH-PDNHUVDSSURDFK¶WKH\DUHDOZD\VWDNLQJ conservative stance) deliberately 
ignores subjective conditions, taking scenario assumptions conservatively to make sure the results are 
generally applicable to any case rather than a certain case only.  
In this study the magnitude of vapour cloud explosions were estimated using the existing empirical 
models. It is well understood, however, that the impact of an explosion may be influenced by the site 
geometry, structures and metrological conditions. Ignoring such factors may lead to over- or under-
estimation of explosion impact for some cases. If a site-specific micro-scale analysis is to be carried 
out, the state-of-art methods, such as computational fluid dynamics (CFD), can be used to take into 
account all these factors. It is believed that the current study, whilst lacking the conditional details, was 
a valuable exercise as a generic preliminary investigation. 
Due to its brevity of history it is far too early to accumulate a meaningful statistics regarding accidents 
of FLNG. Consequently, this study had to borrow equivalent data from offshore and chemical industries. 
As a result, there may be some arguments about the accuracy of the estimated frequencies in the 
quantitative sense. However, there is no doubt whatever that the design of LNG liquefaction module 
support structures needs to be revisited and it has been made abundantly clear that the safety gaps are 
indeed very important in ensuring the safety. 
Despite some of these shortcomings, this study has given some insight into one aspect of FLNG safety 
which may benefit ship-owners, designers and rule-makers in their constant endeavour to improve the 
safety of vessels. 
It may be necessary to develop more explosion scenarios and conduct case-by-case simulation by 
predicting exact leak duration and ignition timing for each case to make it closer to real situations. Since 
the explosion impact depends on the distance from the ignition point, it is also necessary to study the 
impact for various points of ignition in conjunction with the probability of ignition taking place at these 
locations. Furthermore, the structural area which is exposed to the explosion pressure needs to be 
accurately represented. 
Given the fact that this study investigated the adequacy or otherwise of current practices of establishing 
safety gaps for FLNG topside structures. Consequently, this paper intentionally ignored other types of 
hazards, such as cryogenic burns, embrittlement, etc., as it is believed they will not influence the extent 
of the safety gap. On the other hand, this paper is not at all advocating that such hazards are trivial. 
Indeed, to improve the total safety of FLNGs such hazards will need to be investigated, possibly in 
future studies. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This study investigated the risk of potential VCE to the structure of liquefaction modules on an FLNG. 
The results indicate that the magnitude of VCE at a module with a critical probability level is so high 
that the accident can escalate to the neighbouring modules. It was also found that the extent of the safety 
gaps applied to the case ship may be insufficient in some cases. It was concluded that additional safety 
measures are required to prevent the accidents from spreading to the neighbouring modules. 
Results of FE analysis showed that I-beam structures are vulnerable to the impact of explosion, 
primarily because such structural elements are non-isotropic with the weakest direction being the 
horizontal load on the web. It was found that circular pipes of equivalent cross sectional areas can 
replace the I-beams. Using the pipes as the main structural elements, the safety gaps can be reduced to 
less than 20 m.  
It is believed that it is necessary to establish a more specific regulatory framework urgently so that the 
safety of these new and potentially popular units can be ensured through better design and construction. 
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Fig. 1. Proposed event tree (Dan et al, 2014; Woodward, 2010). 
  
 Fig. 2. Dimensionless peak overpressure vs scaled distance for BST model (Melton and Marx, 2009; Woodward 
and Pitbaldo, 2010). 
 Fig. 3. Top side arrangement of FLNG (Lee et al., 2016). 
  
 Fig. 4. Configuration of liquefaction process system (Lee et al., 2012). 
 Fig. 5. Top-side arrangement of the modules. 
  
 Fig. 6. Exceedance diagram for overpressure with respect to explosion frequency (TNT method). 
  
 Fig. 7. Structural model of the LNG liquefaction module. 
  
1
X Y
Z
                                                                                
FEB 24 2017
13:41:44
ELEMENTS
 Fig. 8. Applied static load considering equipment weight 
  
 Fig. 9. Triangular blast pressure profile (Aiwei, 2012). 
  
 Fig. 10. Pressure-time curve 
 
 Fig. 11. VCE Cases 
 
  
  
Fig. 12. Results of FEA based on the TNT method. 
 
  
  
Fig. 13. Results of FE analysis on modified structure for the TNT model. 
 Fig. 14. Directionality of structural strength of I-beams and round pipes 
  
  
 
Table 1 Probability of immediate ignition (DNV, 2012). 
Release rate (kg/s) Immediate ignition 
probability Gas Liquid 
<1 <1.2 0.01% 
1-10 1.2-25 0.1% 
>10 >25 1% 
 
  
 Table 2 Probability of delayed ignition (OGP, 2010). 
Release 
rate(kg/s) 
Delayed ignition probability 
Offshore FPSO gas Offshore FPSO liquid 
0.1 0.001 0.001 
0.2 0.0011 0.0014 
0.5 0.0012 0.0022 
1.0 0.0013 0.003 
2.0 0.003 0.0042 
5.0 0.0092 0.0066 
10.0 0.0213 0.0092 
20.0 0.0493 0.0129 
50.0 0.15 0.02 
100.0 0.15 0.028 
200.0 0.15 0.028 
500.0 0.15 0.028 
1000.0 0.15 0.028 
 
  
 Table 3 Mach numbers (Mw) for BST model 
(Melton and Marx, 2009; Woodward and Pitbaldo, 2010). 
Flame 
Expansion 
Fuel 
Reactivity 
Obstacle Density 
Low Medium High 
1 D High 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Medium 1.03 1.77 2.27 
Low 0.294 1.03 2.27 
2D High 0.59 1.03 1.77 
Medium 0.47 0.66 1.6 
Low 0.079 0.47 0.66 
2.5D High 0.47 0.58 1.18 
Medium 0.29 0.55 1.0 
Low 0.053 0.35 0.5 
3D High 0.36 0.153 0.588 
Medium 0.11 0.44 0.5 
Low 0.026 0.23 0.34 
 
Table 4 System characteristics of each group (Lee et al., 2012). 
Group 
No. 
Operation conditions Mass Composition (%) Equipment list (number of items) 
Press. 
(bar) 
Temp. 
(K) 
Phase Ethane Propane nButane 
Nitro-
gen 
Methane iButane iPentane 
Compre- 
ssor 
Flange 
Heat 
exchanger 
Pipe 
(per 
meter) 
Trap 
Exp. 
valve 
1 19.2 353.5 V 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - 1 2 - 1 - - 
2 19.2 309.5 L 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 1 1 - - 
3 19.2 273.1 L 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 1 1 - - 
4 19.2 273.1 L 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - 1 2 - 1 - - 
5 7.6 270.0 L 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 - 1 - 1 
6 7.6 302.1 V 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 1 1 - - 
7 19.2 273.0 L 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 - 1 - - 
8 19.2 240.0 L 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 1 1 - - 
9 2.8 236.5 L 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 - 1 - 1 
10 2.8 267.8 V 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 1 1 - - 
11 7.6 312.6 V 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - 1 2 - 1 - - 
12 7.6 307.2 V 24.82 64.16 11.02 - - - - - 2 - 1 - - 
13 48.6 414.9 V 29.9 21.3 - 7 41.8 - - 1 2 - 1 - - 
14 48.6 305.0 V 29.9 21.3 - 7 41.8 - - - 2 1 1 - - 
15 48.6 273.1 V 29.9 21.3 - 7 41.8 - - - 2 1 1 - - 
16 48.6 240.0 L 29.9 21.3 - 7 41.8 - - - 2 1 1 - - 
17 48.6 240.0 L 35.0 30.1 - 2.9 32 - - - 2 - 1 1 - 
18 48.6 144.7 L 35.0 30.1 - 2.9 32 - - - 2 1 1 - - 
19 3 139.2 L 35.0 30.1 - 2.9 32 - - - 2 - 1 - 1 
20 48.6 240.0 V 14.1 3.3 - 17.1 65.5 - - - 2 - 1 - - 
21 48.6 144.7 L 14.1 3.3 - 17.1 65.5 - - - 2 1 1 - - 
22 48.6 113.0 L 14.1 3.3 - 17.1 65.5 - - - 2 1 1 - - 
23 3 106.7 L 14.1 3.3 - 17.1 65.5 - - - 2 - 1 - 1 
24 3 141.1 V 14.1 3.3 - 17.1 65.5 - - - 2 1 1 - - 
25 3 140.2 L 29.9 21.3 - 7 41.8 - - - 2 - 1 - - 
26 3 234.3 V 29.9 21.3 - 7 41.8 - - - 2 1 1 - - 
27 65 300.0 V 5.5 2.1 0.5 - 87.5 0.3 0.1 - 2 - 1 - - 
28 65 273.0 V 5.5 2.1 0.5 - 87.5 0.3 0.1 - 2 1 1 - - 
29 65 240.0 V 5.5 2.1 0.5 - 87.5 0.3 0.1  2 1 1 - - 
30 65 144.7 L 5.5 2.1 0.5 - 87.5 0.3 0.1 - 2 1 1 - - 
31 65 113.0 L 5.5 2.1 0.5 - 87.5 0.3 0.1 - 2 1 1 - - 
L=liquid, V=vapour 
 
 
 
Table 5 Result of ETA to estimate the probability of VCE. 
G LS 
Frequency 
G LS 
Frequency 
G LS 
Frequency 
G LS 
Frequency 
IF IP DP SR EP IF IP DP SR EP IF IP DP SR EP IF IP DP SR EP 
1 
3 3.66E-02 0.9999 0.001 0.5 1.83E-05 
9 
3 7.25E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 3.62E-07 
17 
 
3 3.42E-03 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 3.76E-06 
25 
 
3 1.69E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 8.43E-08 
10 1.59E-02 0.9999 0.0012 0.5 9.52E-06 10 2.41E-04 0.9999 0.003 0.5 3.61E-07 10 1.88E-03 0.999 0.0066 0.5 6.19E-06 10 6.22E-05 0.9999 0.003 0.5 9.32E-08 
50 7.00E-03 0.999 0.0213 0.5 7.44E-05 50 7.71E-05 0.999 0.02 0.5 7.71E-07 50 1.10E-03 0.99 0.028 0.5 1.52E-05 50 2.27E-05 0.999 0.02 0.5 2.26E-07 
100 2.62E-03 0.99 0.15 0.5 1.95E-04 100 4.41E-05 0.99 0.028 0.5 6.12E-07 100 7.01E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 9.72E-06 100 2.27E-05 0.99 0.028 0.5 3.15E-07 
2 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 1.06E-06 
10 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
18 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 1.06E-06 
26 
 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
10 4.42E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 1.46E-06 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 2.21E-07 10 4.42E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 1.46E-06 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 2.21E-07 
50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 2.90E-06 50 2.09E-04 0.9999 0.0013 0.5 1.36E-07 50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 2.90E-06 50 2.09E-04 0.9999 0.0013 0.5 1.36E-07 
100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 1.47E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.999 0.0092 0.5 4.88E-07 100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 1.47E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.999 0.0092 0.5 4.88E-07 
3 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 1.06E-06 
11 
3 3.66E-02 0.9999 0.001 0.5 1.83E-05 
19 
3 7.25E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 3.62E-07 
27 
3 1.69E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 8.43E-08 
10 4.42E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 1.46E-06 10 1.59E-02 0.9999 0.001 0.5 7.94E-06 10 2.41E-04 0.9999 0.003 0.5 3.61E-07 10 6.22E-05 0.9999 0.0013 0.5 4.04E-08 
50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 2.90E-06 50 7.00E-03 0.999 0.0092 0.5 3.21E-05 50 7.71E-05 0.999 0.02 0.5 7.71E-07 50 2.27E-05 0.99 0.0493 0.5 5.53E-07 
100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 1.47E-06 100 2.62E-03 0.999 0.0213 0.5 2.79E-05 100 4.41E-05 0.99 0.028 0.5 6.12E-07 100 2.27E-05 0.99 0.15 0.5 1.69E-06 
4 
3 3.66E-02 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 4.02E-05 
12 
3 1.69E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 8.45E-08 
20 
3 1.69E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 8.43E-08 
28 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
10 1.59E-02 0.999 0.0066 0.5 5.23E-05 10 1.59E-02 0.9999 0.001 0.5 7.94E-06 10 6.22E-05 0.9999 0.0013 0.5 4.04E-08 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.0013 0.5 2.88E-07 
50 7.00E-03 0.99 0.028 0.5 9.70E-05 50 7.00E-03 0.999 0.0092 0.5 3.21E-05 50 2.27E-05 0.99 0.0493 0.5 5.53E-07 50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.0493 0.5 5.11E-06 
100 2.62E-03 0.99 0.028 0.5 3.63E-05 100 2.62E-03 0.999 0.0213 0.5 2.79E-05 100 2.27E-05 0.99 0.15 0.5 1.69E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.15 0.5 7.88E-06 
5 
3 7.25E-04 0.9999 0.0014 0.5 5.07E-07 
13 
 
3 3.66E-02 0.9999 0.001 0.5 1.83E-05 
21 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 1.06E-06 
29 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
10 2.41E-04 0.999 0.0042 0.5 5.06E-07 10 1.59E-02 0.9999 0.0012 0.5 9.52E-06 10 4.42E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 1.46E-06 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.0013 0.5 2.88E-07 
50 7.71E-05 0.99 0.02 0.5 7.64E-07 50 7.00E-03 0.99 0.0493 0.5 1.71E-04 50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 2.90E-06 50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.0493 0.5 5.11E-06 
100 4.41E-05 0.99 0.028 0.5 6.12E-07 100 2.62E-03 0.99 0.15 0.5 1.95E-04 100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 1.47E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.15 0.5 7.88E-06 
6 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
14 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
22 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 1.06E-06 
30 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 2.21E-07 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.0012 0.5 2.65E-07 10 4.42E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 1.46E-06 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.0014 0.5 3.10E-07 
50 2.09E-04 0.999 0.0092 0.5 9.62E-07 50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.0493 0.5 5.11E-06 50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 2.90E-06 50 2.09E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 6.90E-07 
100 1.06E-04 0.999 0.0213 0.5 1.13E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.15 0.5 7.88E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 1.47E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.999 0.0129 0.5 6.84E-07 
7 
3 1.69E-04 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 1.85E-07 
15 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
23 
 
3 7.25E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 3.62E-07 
31 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
10 6.22E-05 0.999 0.0066 0.5 2.05E-07 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.0013 0.5 2.88E-07 10 2.41E-04 0.9999 0.003 0.5 3.61E-07 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.0014 0.5 3.10E-07 
50 2.27E-05 0.99 0.028 0.5 3.14E-07 50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.0493 0.5 5.11E-06 50 7.71E-05 0.999 0.02 0.5 7.71E-07 50 2.09E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 6.90E-07 
100 2.27E-05 0.99 0.028 0.5 3.15E-07 100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.15 0.5 7.88E-06 100 4.41E-05 0.99 0.028 0.5 6.12E-07 100 1.06E-04 0.999 0.0129 0.5 6.84E-07 
8 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 1.06E-06 
16 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.0022 0.5 1.06E-06 
24 
3 9.68E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 4.84E-07 
 
      
10 4.42E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 1.46E-06 10 4.42E-04 0.999 0.0066 0.5 1.46E-06 10 4.42E-04 0.9999 0.001 0.5 2.21E-07       
50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 2.90E-06 50 2.09E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 2.90E-06 50 2.09E-04 0.999 0.003 0.5 3.14E-07       
100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 1.47E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.99 0.028 0.5 1.47E-06 100 1.06E-04 0.999 0.0092 0.5 4.88E-07       
G = Group Number, LS=Leak hole size (mm), IF=Initial leak frequency (/year), IP= Immediate ignition probability DP=Delayed ignition probability, SR=Surrounding ratio, EP=Explosion probability (/year) 
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Table 6 Leak rate for various leak hole sizes. 
Grou
p 
Leakage rate (kg/s) 
Grou
p 
Leakage rate (kg/s) 
3mm 
10m
m 
50m
m 
100m
m 
3mm 
10m
m 
50m
m 
100m
m 
1 0.02 0.22 5.55 22.20 17 0.31 3.42 85.44 341.75 
2 0.20 2.25 56.22 224.89 18 0.31 3.42 85.44 341.75 
3 0.20 2.25 56.22 224.89 19 0.08 0.85 21.23 84.91 
4 0.20 2.25 56.22 224.89 20 0.05 0.50 12.61 50.42 
5 0.13 1.41 35.37 141.49 21 0.30 3.37 84.30 337.21 
6 0.01 0.10 2.38 9.50 22 0.30 3.37 84.30 337.21 
7 0.20 2.25 56.22 224.89 23 0.08 0.84 20.94 83.78 
8 0.20 2.25 56.22 224.89 24 0.01 0.04 1.01 4.06 
9 0.08 0.86 21.47 85.88 25 0.08 0.85 21.14 84.54 
10 0.00 0.04 0.93 3.72 26 0.00 0.04 0.88 3.52 
11 0.01 0.09 2.34 9.34 27 0.05 0.53 13.30 53.19 
12 0.01 0.09 2.36 9.42 28 0.05 0.56 13.94 55.76 
13 0.04 0.43 10.71 42.82 29 0.05 0.59 14.87 59.47 
14 0.04 0.50 12.49 49.95 30 0.01 0.15 3.70 14.79 
15 0.05 0.53 13.20 52.78 31 0.01 0.15 3.70 14.79 
16 0.31 3.40 85.07 340.27      
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Table 7 Estimated explosion pressure in accordance with the safety gaps. 
Specification Methods Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Distance from the ignition point 
(Equivalent to safety gap) 
20 m 15 m 12.5 m 
Explosion pressures 
TNT 0.77 bar 1.24 bar 1.82 bar 
TNO 1.0 bar 1.0 bar 1.0 bar 
BST 0.7 bar 1.0 bar 1.0 bar 
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Table 8 I-Beam sizes used in the modules (DSME, 2013b). 
Category 
I-Beam size (mm) 
 
w1 & w2 w3 t1 & t2 t3 
1 200 500 15 10 
2 500 1500 30 15 
3 400 1500 30 15 
4 400 1200 30 12 
5 300 800 25 10 
6 300 800 20 8 
7 450 800 30 10 
w1: width of top flange, w2:width of bottom flange, w3:web depth, t1:thickness of top flange, t2:thickness of bottom 
flange, t3: web thickness 
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Table 9 Estimated explosion pressure for various safety gaps. 
Method 
Safety gap 
(m) 
Applied pressure 
(Bar) 
Max. equivalent 
stress (N/mm2) 
TNT 
20.0 0.77 526.6 
15.0 1.24 873.9 
12.5 1.82 1480.5 
TNO 
20.0 1.0 683.8 
15.0 1.0 705.6 
12.5 1.0 813.9 
BST 
20.0 0.7 478.7 
15.0 1.0 705.6 
12.5 1.0 813.9 
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Table 10 List of pipe sizes. 
Category Pipe size 
(sectional area 
equivalent to I-Beam) 
 
Dia. t4 
1 194 mm 20 mm 
2 856 mm 20 mm 
3 760 mm 20 mm 
4 536 mm 20 mm 
5 386 mm 20 mm 
6 312 mm 20 mm 
7 576 mm 20 mm 
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Table 11 Equivalent stresses for I-beam and pipe structures. 
Method Safety 
gap (m) 
Applied 
pressure 
(Bar) 
Max. equivalent stress (N/mm2) Reduced rate 
(%) 
Beam structure Pipe structure 
TNT 20 0.77 526.5 219.3 57 
15 1.24 873.9 282.5 67 
12.5 1.82 1,480.5 317.1 78 
TNO 20 1.0 683.8 221.3 68 
15 1.0 705.6 269.1 62 
12.5 1.0 813.9 220.9 73 
BST 20 0.7 478.6 218.8 54 
15 1.0 705.6 269.1 62 
12.5 1.0 813.9 220.9 73 
 
 
 
 
